Prof. Branco Urosevic from the Faculty of Economics, Belgrade (Serbia), and the Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona (Spain) is giving a VGSF research seminar on "Ownership Dynamics with Multiple Insiders: The case of REITs" on FRIDAY, June 23rd, from 15:30 to 17:00 at the Institute for Advanced Studies (Institut für Höhere Studien, Stumpergasse 56, 1060 Wien), Lecture Room (HS) 2. Please find the paper's abstract below.

Coffee and snacks are going to be available in the cafeteria of IHS, which is located next to the lecture room, before and after the seminar.

Information regarding the further schedule of the VGSF research seminar can be found at www.vgsf.ac.at!

Best, Michael Halling

Abstract We study ownership dynamics of multiple strategic risk-averse insiders facing a moral hazard problem. We show that, when insiders cannot commit, ex-ante, to an ownership policy, the aggregate insider stake gradually declines towards the competitive allocation. Moreover, both the speed of decline and the long-term equilibrium aggregate insider ownership level are greater for companies with a higher number of insiders, ceteris paribus. We, then, test the model on data from the U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) industry and find that the predictions of the model are supported by the data.