AENDERUNG

zum Betriebswirtschaftlichen Forschungsseminar des Instituts fuer Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universitaet Wien Bruenner Strasse 72, 1210 Wien

Der Vortrag von Prof. Ron Giammarino (University of British Columbia) am Dienstag, den 30.4.1996 um 15.30 im HS 8 des BWZ, lautet nicht wie angekuendigt

,The Evolution of Firm Value and the Allocative Role of Greenmail",

sondern

,A Value Enhancing Role for Greenmail and Defensive Measures".

Abstract: A popular view of corporate defensive measures, such as poison pills, shareholders' rights plans and greenmail, is that they are evidence of entrenched, self-interested management. Empirical evidence, such as a target stock price decline subsequent to the payment of greenmail, is cited as support for this view. Somewhat inconsistent with this argument is the overwhelming rate of acceptance of such measures by shareholders, with very little stock price reaction. We model an informational role for greenmail and show that value-maximizing management will pay greenmail that leads to a stock price decline. Consistent with the empirical evidence, the decline exceeds the value of the greenmail payment. Moreover, shareholders have an incentive to impose a defensive measure, such as a poison pill, to limit takeover attempts if the target stock price is too low or the raider has too high an initial shareholding in the target.

Renate Kogler Lehrstuhl fuer Controlling Institut fuer BWL Universitaet Wien Bruenner Strasse 72 A-1210 Wien Tel.: +43-1-29128-402 Fax : +43-1-29128-404 =========================================================================