AENDERUNG
zum Betriebswirtschaftlichen Forschungsseminar des
Instituts fuer Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universitaet Wien
Bruenner Strasse 72, 1210 Wien
Der Vortrag von Prof. Ron Giammarino (University of British Columbia)
am Dienstag, den 30.4.1996 um 15.30 im HS 8 des BWZ, lautet nicht wie
angekuendigt
,The Evolution of Firm Value and the Allocative Role of Greenmail",
sondern
,A Value Enhancing Role for Greenmail and Defensive Measures".
Abstract:
A popular view of corporate defensive measures, such as poison pills,
shareholders' rights plans and greenmail, is that they are evidence of
entrenched, self-interested management. Empirical evidence, such as
a target stock price decline subsequent to the payment of greenmail,
is cited as support for this view. Somewhat inconsistent with this
argument is the overwhelming rate of acceptance of such measures
by shareholders, with very little stock price reaction. We model an
informational role for greenmail and show that value-maximizing
management will pay greenmail that leads to a stock price decline.
Consistent with the empirical evidence, the decline exceeds the value
of the greenmail payment. Moreover, shareholders have an incentive
to impose a defensive measure, such as a poison pill, to limit takeover
attempts if the target stock price is too low or the raider has too high
an initial shareholding in the target.
Renate Kogler
Lehrstuhl fuer Controlling
Institut fuer BWL
Universitaet Wien
Bruenner Strasse 72
A-1210 Wien
Tel.: +43-1-29128-402
Fax : +43-1-29128-404
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