As this week there were no FAM-seminars, we are pleased to announce
the talk of Jaska Cvitanic within the lecture series of the VGSF.
One of the next guests of the VGSF is Tomas Björk, see also:
http://www.vgsf.ac.at/activities/seminars.htm
Best regards, Sandra Trenovatz (FAM-office)
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Fr, 2008-03-14, 15:30-17:00
Vienna Institute of Finance (WU-H46),
1190, Heiligenstädter Strasse 46-48,
seminar room 1 (ground floor)
Jaska Cvitanic
California Institute of Technology
"Optimal Contract in Continuous Time"
Paper 1:
Optimal Contracts in Continuous-Time Models
In this paper we present a unified approach to solving contracting
problems with full information in models driven by Brownian Motion. We
apply the stochastic maximum principle to give necessary and sufficient
conditions for contracts that implement the so-called first-best
solution. The optimal contract is proportional to the difference between
the underlying process controlled by the agent and a stochastic,
state-contingent benchmark. Our methodology covers a number of
frameworks considered in the existing literature. The main finance
applications of this theory are optimal compensation of company
executives and of portfolio managers.
Paper 2:
Optimal contracting with random time of payment and outside options
We consider continuous-time Principal-Agent problems in which the payoff
is delivered at an optimal random time, in cases of moral hazard and/or
adverse selection. The principal can design contracts of a simple form
that induce the agent to ask for the payo® at the time of principal's
choosing. The optimal time of payment depends on the agent's and the
principal's outside options. In examples with CARA utilities, under
specific "stationarity" conditions on the outside options, it is not
optimal for the principal to give the agent the option to exercise the
contract at a random time. However, in general, the optimal payment time
is typically random. Examples of this include the following cases: the
agent can be ¯red, after having been paid a severance payment, and then
replaced by another agent; the agent and the principal have asymmetric
beliefs on the return of the output. In the case of adverse selection,
the agents of lower type exercise early, while the agents of higher type
wait until the end. The methodology we use for the general theory is the
stochastic maximum principle and its link to Forward-Backward Stochastic
Differential Equations and their reflected version, appropriate for
optimal stopping problems.
The papers to be presented can be downloaded from the VGSF website
(
http://www.vgsf.ac.at/activities/seminars.htm).
Professor Cvitanic will come to WU-H46 (Building of Vienna Institute of
Finance) on Friday morning. Please contact professor Damir Filipovic
(
http://www.vif.ac.at/filipovic/) if you would like to arrange an
individual meeting with him.