---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2002 14:38:02 +0100
From: Beatrix Pawelczak <pawelcza(a)ihs.ac.at>
Dear Sir or Madam,
Dear NOEG Member,
We cordially invite you to the
PUBLIC LECTURE AT IHS
on Thursday, February 28, 2002
at 4.30 p.m.
Institute for Advanced Studies, Hörsaal II
Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Wien.
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Roger GUESNERIE
(DELTA - Ecole normale supérieure)
"Expectational Stability in Finance Models: The Case of Price-revealing
Equilibria."
ABSTRACT We consider a simple competitive model à la Grossman, in which
prices may transmit the information held by the informed agents to the
uninformed ones. We analyse expectational coordination on the price
revealing equilibrium from an 'sductive' or 'cognitive' viewpoint. We
stress factors favouring expectational coordination. In particular,
expectational coordination is destabilized whenever uninformed agents
extract (at equilibrium) too much information.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Best Regards
Beatrix Pawelczak
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