

# DESIGN OF OPTIMAL COST-EFFICIENT PAYOFFS AND CORRESPONDING INVESTMENT STRATEGIES

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# OUTLINE

- 1 INTRODUCTION
- 2 A STOCHASTIC OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
- 3 APPLICATION TO MATHEMATICAL FINANCE

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3 APPLICATION TO MATHEMATICAL FINANCE

# ASSUMPTIONS

- We consider an investor with fixed investment period  $I = [0, T]$  or  $I = \{0, 1, \dots, T\}$  and there is no intermediate consumption.
- The investor is just interested in the (probability) distribution function of terminal wealth (law-invariant preferences).
- We consider a perfectly liquid, frictionless and arbitrage-free market with  $d$  assets  $S^1, S^2, \dots, S^d$  and a numéraire  $B$  on a filtered probability space  $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \{\mathcal{F}_t\}_{t \in I}, \mathbb{P})$ .
- We assume that there exists a state-price process.

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# STATE-PRICE PROCESS

## DEFINITION: STATE-PRICE PROCESS

A  $\mathbb{P}$ -a.s. non-negative adapted stochastic (càdlàg in the continuous-time case) process  $\{\xi_t\}_{t \in I}$  on  $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \{\mathcal{F}_t\}_{t \in I}, \mathbb{P})$  is called a state-price process if  $\{\xi_t S_t\}_{t \in I}$  is a  $\mathbb{P}$ -martingale.

Under the existence of an equivalent martingale  $\mathbb{Q}$  measure a version of the state-price process is given by (a càdlàg version in the continuous-time case) of  $\frac{1}{B_t} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}}[d\mathbb{Q}/d\mathbb{P} | \mathcal{F}_t]$ .



# WHAT IS COST-EFFICIENCY?

## DEFINITION: THE INITIAL COST

The initial cost of a terminal (at time  $T$ ) payoff  $h \in L^0(\Omega, \mathcal{F}_T, \mathbb{P})$  with  $\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}}[(\xi_T h)^-] < \infty$  is given by

$$c(h) := \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}}[\xi_T h] \left( = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}} \left[ \frac{1}{B_T} h \right] \right).$$

## DEFINITION: COST-EFFICIENCY

A terminal payoff  $h \in L^0(\Omega, \mathcal{F}_T, \mathbb{P})$  with initial cost  $c(h)$  is cost-efficient if every other payoff  $\tilde{h}$ , with  $\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}}[(\xi_T \tilde{h})^-] < \infty$ , which has the same distribution as  $h$  at time  $T$  does not have a lower initial cost, i.e.

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# HISTORY

- Dybvig (1988) uses a preference-free framework to compare two terminal payoffs by analysing their cost. He gives a characterization of the optimal payoff in complete one-dimensional markets.
- Vanduffel (2009) shows similar results for incomplete one-dimensional Lévy markets using the Esscher transform.
- Bernard, Boyle and Vanduffel (2011) give an explicit representation of cost-efficient payoffs (mostly under the assumption that the state-price density  $\xi_T$  has a continuous distribution function). Moreover they extend the theory by adding state-dependent constraints.


## INTRODUCTORY EXAMPLE

Let us consider a simple example, with the following properties:

- A market with a bond  $B$  and a stock  $S$ .
- The bond has an effective deterministic interest rate of 0%.
- The dynamics of the stock are given by a two-period binomial model.

## INTRODUCTORY EXAMPLE


Hence the up and down movements of the underlying stock are independent with a given physical probability of  $p = 1/2$ .



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
Thus we have  $\mathbb{P}(S_2 = 16) = 1/4$ ,  $\mathbb{P}(S_2 = 4) = 1/2$  and  $\mathbb{P}(S_2 = 1) = 1/4$ .  
The risk-neutral probability for the stock to double is given by

$$q = \frac{1 - \frac{1}{2}}{2 - \frac{1}{2}} = \frac{1}{3}.$$




## INTRODUCTORY EXAMPLE

Then the state-price process can be calculated as follows.



## INTRODUCTORY EXAMPLE



Consider two payoffs  $h$  and  $\tilde{h}$ .

$$h := \begin{cases} 1 & \text{for } S_2 = 16, \\ 2 & \text{for } S_2 = 4, \\ 3 & \text{for } S_2 = 1, \end{cases}$$

$$\tilde{h} := \begin{cases} 3 & \text{for } S_2 = 16, \\ 2 & \text{for } S_2 = 4, \\ 1 & \text{for } S_2 = 1. \end{cases}$$

It is immediate that  $h$  and  $\tilde{h}$  have the same distribution under  $\mathbb{P}$ .



## INTRODUCTORY EXAMPLE

Hence for every Borel-measurable function  $u : \{1, 2, 3\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ , in particular for every utility function, we have

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}}[u(h)] = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}}[u(\tilde{h})].$$

**BUT**, for the initial costs of the two payoffs we get

$$\begin{aligned} c(h) &= \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}}[\xi_2 h] = \frac{q^2}{p^2} p^2 1 + \frac{q(1-q)}{p(1-p)} 2p(1-p) 2 + \frac{(1-q)^2}{(1-p)^2} (1-p)^2 3 \\ &= \frac{1}{9} + \frac{8}{9} + \frac{12}{9} \approx 2.33, \end{aligned}$$

and

$$c(\tilde{h}) = \frac{3}{9} + \frac{8}{9} + \frac{4}{9} \approx 1.67.$$

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# AN IMPORTANT DEFINITION

## DEFINITION: THE SET $M$

For a real-valued random variable  $\xi$  on  $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$  and a distribution function  $F$  we define

$$M(F, \xi) := \{Y \in L^0(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P}) \mid \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}}[(\xi Y)^-] < \infty, \mathbb{P}Y^{-1} = F\}.$$

Let  $X \in L^0(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$  be a given random variable. Then for notational purposes we write  $M(X, \xi)$  instead of  $M(\mathbb{P}X^{-1}, \xi)$ .

# THE GOAL

As before, let  $\xi \in L^0(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$  be a real-valued random variable and let  $F$  be a distribution function. Then the goal is to find an explicit representation of random variables  $Y^*, Z^* \in M(F, \xi)$  for which

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$$\mathbb{E}[\xi Z^*] = \sup_{Z \in M(F, \xi)} \mathbb{E}[\xi Z],$$

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# CO- AND COUNTERMONOTONICITY

## DEFINITION: FOR SUBSETS

For a subset  $A \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2$  we define the following:

- 1  $A$  is called comonotonic if  $(x_1 - x_2)(y_1 - y_2) \geq 0$  for all  $(x_i, y_i) \in A$  with  $i \in \{1, 2\}$ .
- 2  $A$  is called countermonotonic if  $(x_1 - x_2)(y_1 - y_2) \leq 0$  for all  $(x_i, y_i) \in A$  with  $i \in \{1, 2\}$ .

## DEFINITION: FOR RANDOM PAIRS

A random pair  $(\xi, X) \in L^0(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P}) \times L^0(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$  is called comonotonic (countermonotonic) if there exists a comonotonic (countermonotonic) Borel-measurable subset  $A \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2$  with  $\mathbb{P}((\xi, X) \in A) = 1$ .

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
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

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# ILLUSTRATION OF CO- AND COUNTERMONOTONICITY


Comonotonic



Comonotonic



Neither-nor



Countermonotonic

## A GENERALIZED CONCEPT

Consider an increasing function  $g : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  and a real-valued random variable  $\xi \in L^0(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$ .

If  $\xi(\omega_1) < \xi(\omega_2)$  for  $\omega_1, \omega_2 \in \Omega$ , then it immediately follows that, by the monotonicity of  $g$ ,  $g(\xi(\omega_1)) \leq g(\xi(\omega_2))$ .

$\Rightarrow (\xi, g(\xi))$  is a comonotonic pair.

Correspondingly:  $g$  decreasing  $\Rightarrow (\xi, g(\xi))$  is a countermonotonic pair.

# THE CENTRAL LEMMA

## LEMMA: OPTIMAL BOUNDS FOR PAYOFFS

Consider two real-valued random variables  $\xi, X \in L^0(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$  with  $\mathbb{E}[\xi^-] < \infty$  and  $\mathbb{E}[(\xi X)^-] < \infty$ .

- 1 Then, if the pair  $(\xi, X)$  is comonotonic, then

$$\mathbb{E}[\xi X] \geq \mathbb{E}[\xi Y], \quad Y \in M(X, \xi).$$

- 2 Then, if the pair  $(\xi, X)$  is countermonotonic, then

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- 3 If in addition  $\mathbb{E}[|\xi X|] < \infty$ , then the equalities above hold if and only if  $(\xi, X)$  is comonotonic or countermonotonic, respectively.

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
Let  $F$  be a distribution function. Then the lower quantile function  $F^{\leftarrow} : [0, 1] \rightarrow \overline{\mathbb{R}}$  of  $F$  is defined as

$$F^{\leftarrow}(y) := \inf\{x \in \overline{\mathbb{R}} \mid F(x) \geq y\}.$$



# THE LOWER QUANTILE FUNCTION

Example: Two values of the lower quantile function of a binomial distribution  $F$  with parameters  $n = 4$  and  $p = 0.4$ .



# THEOREM 1

## THEOREM: GENERAL REPRESENTATION OF OPTIMAL PAYOFFS

Consider a real-valued random variable  $\xi \in L^0(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$  with  $\mathbb{E}[\xi^-] < \infty$  and a given distribution function  $F$ . Then, if there exists a real-valued random variable  $\tilde{\xi} \in L^0(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$  (let  $\tilde{G}$  denote its distribution function) such that the pair  $(\xi, \tilde{\xi})$  is comonotonic and such that

- 1  $\text{im}(F) \subseteq \overline{\text{im}(\tilde{G})}$  and  $\mathbb{E}[(\xi Z^*)^-] < \infty$  for  $Z^* := F^{\leftarrow}(\tilde{G}(\tilde{\xi}))$ , then  $Z^* \in M(F, \xi)$  and

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- 2  $\text{im}(1 - F) \subseteq \overline{\text{im}(\tilde{G})}$  and  $\mathbb{E}[(\xi Y^*)^-] < \infty$  for  $Y^* := F^{\leftarrow}(1 - \tilde{G}(\xi^-))$ , then  $Y^* \in M(F, \xi)$  and

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COROLLARY 1:  $\tilde{\xi} = \xi$ 

## COROLLARY: EXPLICIT REPRESENTATION OF OPTIMAL PAYOFFS

Consider a real-valued random variable  $\xi \in L^0(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$  with  $\mathbb{E}[\xi^-] < \infty$  and let  $G$  denote its distribution function. Consider a given distribution function  $F$ .

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- 3 If in addition  $\mathbb{E}[|\xi Y^*|] < \infty$  or  $\mathbb{E}[|\xi Z^*|] < \infty$ , then  $Y^*$  or  $Z^*$ , respectively, is the a.s. unique optimal payoff in  $M(F, \xi)$ .

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- 1** Then, if  $\text{im}(F) \subseteq \overline{\text{im}(G)}$  and if  $\mathbb{E}[(\xi Z^*)^-] < \infty$  for  $Z^* := F^{\leftarrow}(G(\xi))$ , then  $Z^* \in M(F, \xi)$  and

$$\mathbb{E}[\xi Z^*] \geq \mathbb{E}[\xi Z], \quad Z \in M(F, \xi).$$

- 2** Then, if  $\text{im}(1 - F) \subseteq \overline{\text{im}(G)}$  and if  $\mathbb{E}[(\xi Y^*)^-] < \infty$  for  $Y^* := F^{\leftarrow}(1 - G(\xi-))$ , then  $Y^* \in M(F, \xi)$  and

$$\mathbb{E}[\xi Y^*] \leq \mathbb{E}[\xi Y], \quad Y \in M(F, \xi).$$

- 3** If in addition  $\mathbb{E}[|\xi Y^*|] < \infty$  or  $\mathbb{E}[|\xi Z^*|] < \infty$ , then  $Y^*$  or  $Z^*$ , respectively, is the a.s. unique optimal payoff in  $M(F, \xi)$ .

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## REMARKS TO COROLLARY 1

- If  $G$  is continuous, then  $\overline{\text{im}(G)} = [0, 1]$ . Thus, for every distribution function  $F$ ,

$$\text{im}(F) \subseteq \overline{\text{im}(G)}$$

and

$$\text{im}(1 - F) \subseteq \overline{\text{im}(G)}.$$

- Suppose that  $\xi = 1$  a.s. Then  $\overline{\text{im}(G)} = \{0, 1\}$ . Thus, in general, for distribution function  $F$  we have

$$\text{im}(F) \not\subseteq \overline{\text{im}(G)}$$

and

$$\text{im}(1 - F) \not\subseteq \overline{\text{im}(G)}.$$

## PREPARATION FOR COROLLARY 2

Consider a random variable  $\xi \in L^0(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$  with  $\mathbb{E}[\xi^-] < \infty$ , where  $G$  denotes its distribution function. Let  $F$  be a given distribution function such that  $\text{im}(F) \not\subseteq \overline{\text{im}(G)}$  or  $\text{im}(1 - F) \not\subseteq \overline{\text{im}(G)}$ . Then let

- $\{d_j\}_{j \in J} \dots$  different points of discontinuity of  $G$  for which  
 $(G(d_j -), G(d_j)) \cap \text{im}(F) \neq \emptyset$  or  
 $(G(d_j -), G(d_j)) \cap \text{im}(1 - F) \neq \emptyset$ , respectively.
- $\{p_j\}_{j \in J} \dots$  the corresponding magnitudes.


Then the idea is to 'expand'  $\xi$  to  $\tilde{\xi}$  (where  $\tilde{G}$  denotes its distribution function) such that  $\text{im}(F) \subseteq \overline{\text{im}(\tilde{G})}$  or  $\text{im}(1 - F) \subseteq \overline{\text{im}(\tilde{G})}$ , respectively. For example, if possible, define

$$\tilde{\xi} := \xi + \sum_{j \in J} p_j 1_{(d_j, \infty)}(\xi) + \sum_{j \in J} p_j E_j 1_{\{d_j\}}(\xi)$$


where  $\{E_j\}_{j \in J}$  is a set of random variables with values in  $[0, 1]$  such that  $x \mapsto \mathbb{P}(E_j \leq x \mid \xi = d_j)$  is continuous.

## ILLUSTRATION FOR COROLLARY 2

One discontinuity in the distribution



Removal of it via expansion



## COROLLARY 2: EXPANSION

### COROLLARY: REMOVAL OF UNWANTED ATOMS

Consider the 'expanded' real-valued random variable  $\tilde{\xi} \in L^0(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$  and let  $\tilde{G}$  denote its distribution function. Moreover, consider a distribution function  $F$ . Then,

- 1 if  $\mathbb{E}[(\xi Z^*)^-] < \infty$  for  $Z^* := F^{\leftarrow}(\tilde{G}(\tilde{\xi}))$ , then  $Z^* \in M(F, \xi)$  and

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- 2 if  $\mathbb{E}[(\xi Z^*)^-] < \infty$  for  $Y^* := F^{\leftarrow}(1 - \tilde{G}(\tilde{\xi}^-))$ , then  $Y^* \in M(F, \xi)$  and

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# OUTLINE

- 1 INTRODUCTION
- 2 A STOCHASTIC OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
- 3 APPLICATION TO MATHEMATICAL FINANCE

# INCREASING VON NEUMANN–MORGENSTERN PREFERENCES

Assume an objective function of the investor,  $V$ . Then  $V$  is said to satisfy increasing von Neumann–Morgenstern preferences if:

- The investor prefers ‘more to less’, that is  $V$  preserves first-order stochastic dominance order. I.e., if for two terminal payoffs  $h, \tilde{h} \in L^0(\Omega, \mathcal{F}_T, \mathbb{P})$  we have  $F_{\tilde{h}}(x) \geq F_h(x)$  for all  $x \in \mathbb{R}$ , then  $V(\tilde{h}) \leq V(h)$ .
- The investor has ‘law-invariant preferences’, that is if  $\mathbb{P}h^{-1} = \mathbb{P}\tilde{h}^{-1}$  for two payoffs  $h, \tilde{h} \in L^0(\Omega, \mathcal{F}_T, \mathbb{P})$  at time  $T$ , then  $V(h) = V(\tilde{h})$ .

Under these fairly general assumptions, together with a deterministic numéraire, such an investor will prefer a cost-efficient payoff  $Y^*$  to any other payoff  $h$  with the same terminal payoff distribution. (In particular for expected utility maximizers with increasing utility functions).



## A TIME-DEPENDENT BLACK–SCHOLES MARKET

Let  $I := [0, T]$  and consider a Brownian motion  $\{W_t\}_{t \in I}$  on a filtered probability space  $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \{\mathcal{F}_t\}_{t \in I}, \mathbb{P})$ . Let the constant  $S_0 > 0$  denote the initial stock price. Then the underlying stock price process  $\{S_t\}_{t \in I}$  is given by the SDE

$$dS_t = \sigma(t)S_t dW_t + \mu(t, \cdot)S_t dt, \quad t \in I,$$

where  $\sigma$  and  $\mu$  are assumed to satisfy usual measurability and integrability conditions. Moreover, we define the numéraire  $B$  by

$$B_t = \exp\left(\int_0^t r(u) du\right), \quad t \in I,$$

where  $r : I \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is assumed to be sufficiently regular such that there exists a sufficiently regular (Novikov condition)  $\theta : I \times \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  with

$$\sigma(u)\theta(u, \omega) = \mu(u, \omega) - r(u), \quad \text{for almost all } (u, \omega) \in I \times \Omega.$$

# A TIME-DEPENDENT BLACK–SCHOLES MARKET

## LEMMA: DYNAMICS OF THE MARKET

Consider the previous assumptions. Then the up to indistinguishability unique, strong and pathwise continuous solution of the SDE is given by the process

$$S_t = S_0 \exp \left( \int_0^t \sigma(u) dW_u + \int_0^t \left( \mu(u, \cdot) - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2(u) \right) du \right), \quad t \in I,$$

which is strictly positive.

## A DETERMINISTIC MARKET

Now assume **deterministic** time-dependent coefficients in our model and define  $\Sigma_{s,t} = \sqrt{\int_s^t \sigma^2(u) du}$  and  $\Theta_{s,t} = \sqrt{\int_s^t \theta^2(u) du}$  for all  $s, t \in I$  with  $s \leq t$ .

Then the state-price process  $\{\xi_t\}_{t \in I}$  is given by

$$\xi_t = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{B_t} \exp\left(-\int_0^t \theta(u) dW_u - \frac{1}{2} \Theta_{0,t}^2\right) & \text{for } t \in I \text{ with } \Theta_{0,t} > 0, \\ \frac{1}{B_t} & \text{for } t \in I \text{ with } \Theta_{0,t} = 0. \end{cases}$$

## A CALL OPTION

Consider a European call option with terminal payoff  $h \in L_+^1(\Omega, \mathcal{F}_T, \mathbb{P})$  given by

$$h := (S_T - K)^+, \quad \text{with } K > 0.$$

Then the continuous version of the cost process (arbitrage-free price) of it is given by

$$c_t(h) = S_t \Phi(d_1(S_t, t)) - K \frac{B_t}{B_T} \Phi(d_2(S_t, t)), \quad t \in I,$$

where  $d_{1,2}(x, t) : (0, \infty) \times I \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is defined by

$$d_{1,2}(x, t) := \frac{\log\left(\frac{x}{K}\right) + \int_t^T r(u) du \pm \frac{1}{2} \Sigma_{t,T}^2}{\Sigma_{t,T}}.$$

# A CALL OPTION

If  $\Theta_{0,T} > 0$ , then the a.s. unique cost-efficient payoff  $Y^*$  of the call option  $h$  is given by

$$\begin{aligned} Y^* &= \left( S_T \exp \left( \frac{\Sigma_{0,T}}{\Theta_{0,T}} \int_0^T \theta(u) dW_u - \int_0^T \sigma(u) dW_u \right) - K \right)^+ \\ &= \left( S_0 \exp \left( \frac{\Sigma_{0,T}}{\Theta_{0,T}} \int_0^T \theta(u) dW_u + \int_0^T \mu(u) du - \frac{1}{2} \Sigma_{0,T}^2 \right) - K \right)^+. \end{aligned}$$

# A CALL OPTION

Moreover define

$$\hat{S}_t := S_0 \exp \left( \frac{\Sigma_{0,T}}{\Theta_{0,T}} \int_0^t \theta(u) dW_u + \int_0^t \mu(u) du - \frac{1}{2} \Sigma_{0,t}^2 \right), \quad t \in I.$$

If  $\sigma(u) > 0$  for all  $u \in I$ , then a version of the cost process of the cost-efficient payoff  $Y^*$  is given by

$$c_t(Y^*) = \begin{cases} \frac{B_t}{B_T} Y^* & \text{for } t \geq T_0, \\ \exp \left( \frac{1}{2} \delta_t + \varepsilon_t \right) \hat{S}_t \Phi(\hat{d}_1(\hat{S}_t, t)) - K \frac{B_t}{B_T} \Phi(\hat{d}_2(\hat{S}_t, t)) & \text{for } t < T_0, \end{cases}$$

where  $T_0 := \inf\{t \in I \mid \Theta_{t,T} = 0\}$ ,  $\varepsilon_t := \int_t^T (\mu(u) - r(u)) du - \frac{\Sigma_{0,T}}{\Theta_{0,T}} \Theta_{t,T}^2$   
 and  $\delta_t := \frac{\Sigma_{0,T}^2}{\Theta_{0,T}^2} \Theta_{t,T}^2 - \Sigma_{t,T}^2$  for all  $t \in I$ , as well as for all  $t \in [0, \infty)$

$$\hat{d}_i(\hat{S}_t, t) := \begin{cases} \frac{\Theta_{0,T} \Sigma_{t,T}}{\Theta_{t,T} \Sigma_{0,T}} \left( d_1(\hat{S}_t, t) + \frac{\delta_t + \varepsilon_t}{\Sigma_{t,T}} \right) & \text{for } i = 1, \\ \frac{\Theta_{0,T} \Sigma_{t,T}}{\Theta_{t,T} \Sigma_{0,T}} \left( d_2(\hat{S}_t, t) + \frac{\varepsilon_t}{\Sigma_{t,T}} \right) & \text{for } i = 2. \end{cases}$$

# A GEOMETRIC ASIAN OPTION

Consider a continuously monitored geometric Asian option with terminal payoff  $g \in L^1_+(\Omega, \mathcal{F}_T, \mathbb{P})$  given by

$$g := \left( \exp \left( \frac{1}{T} \int_0^T \log(S_t) dt \right) - K \right)^+, \quad \text{with } K > 0.$$

This payoff is dominated by the usual arithmetic Asian option and thus provides a lower bound.

Then the initial cost (arbitrage-free price) of it is given by

$$c(g) = \frac{1}{B_T} \left( S_0 \exp \left( \mu_{g,r} + \frac{1}{2} \sigma_g^2 \right) \Phi(d + \sigma_g^2) - K \Phi(d) \right)$$

where  $d := \frac{\log(\frac{S_0}{K}) + \mu_{g,r}}{\sigma_g}$ ,  $\sigma_g = \frac{2}{T^2} \int_0^T \int_0^t \int_0^u \sigma^2(x) dx du dt$  and  $\mu_{g,r} = \frac{1}{T} \int_0^T \int_0^t (r(u) - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2(u)) du dt$ .

# A GEOMETRIC ASIAN OPTION

If  $\Theta_{0,T} > 0$ , then the a.s. unique cost-efficient payoff  $Y^*$  of the geometric Asian option  $g$  is given by

$$Y^* = \left( S_0 \exp \left( \frac{\sigma_g}{\Theta_{0,T}} \int_0^T \theta(u) dW_u + \mu_g \right) - K \right)^+$$

where  $\mu_g = \frac{1}{T} \int_0^T \int_0^t (\mu(u) - \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2(u)) du dt$ . The initial cost of it is given by

$$c(Y^*) = \frac{1}{B_T} \left( S_0 \exp \left( \mu_g + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_g^2 - \sigma_g \Theta_{0,T} \right) \Phi(\hat{d} + \sigma_g^2) - K \Phi(\hat{d}) \right)$$

where  $\hat{d} := \frac{\log(\frac{S_0}{K}) + \mu_g - \sigma_g \Theta_{0,T}}{\sigma_g}$ .



## A JUMP IN THE STATE-PRICE DENSITY

Now assume the following **stochastic** drift: Let  $t_0 \in I$ , let  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  and let  $\theta_i : [t_0, T] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  be Borel-measurable functions for all  $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  such that  $\int_{t_0}^T \theta_i^2(u) du < \infty$  and such that  $\int_{t_0}^T |\sigma(u)\theta_i(u)| du < \infty$  for all  $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ . Then define

$$\mu(u, \omega) := r(u) + \sum_{i=1}^n 1_{[t_0, T] \times A_i}(u, \omega) \mu_i(u), \quad (u, \omega) \in I \times \Omega,$$

where

$$\mu_i(u) := \sigma(u)\theta_i(u), \quad (i, u) \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\} \times [t_0, T],$$

where the  $A_i$  are  $\mathcal{F}_{t_0}$ -measurable and mutually disjoint.

## A JUMP IN THE STATE-PRICE DENSITY

Then the state-price density at time  $T$  is given by

$$\xi_T = \frac{1}{B_T} \exp \left( - \sum_{i=1}^n 1_{A_i} \left( \int_{t_0}^T \theta_i(u) dW_u + \frac{1}{2} \hat{\Theta}_i^2 \right) \right),$$

where  $\hat{\Theta}_i := \sqrt{\int_{t_0}^T \theta_i^2(u) du}$  for all  $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ . Moreover, there exists a subset  $J \subseteq \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  such that  $\hat{\Theta}_i > 0$  for all  $i \in J$  and such that  $\hat{\Theta}_i = 0$  for all  $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\} \setminus J$ . Then the distribution function  $G$  of  $\xi_T$  is given by

$$G(x) = \begin{cases} 1 - \sum_{i \in J} \mathbb{P}(A_i) + \sum_{i \in J} \mathbb{P}(A_i) G_i(x) & \text{for } x \geq \frac{1}{B_T}, \\ \sum_{i \in J} \mathbb{P}(A_i) G_i(x) & \text{for } 0 < x < \frac{1}{B_T}, \\ 0 & \text{for } x \leq 0, \end{cases}$$

where  $G_i(x) := \Phi((\log(x) + \int_0^T r(u) du + \frac{1}{2} \hat{\Theta}_i^2) / \hat{\Theta}_i)$  for all  $(x, i) \in (0, \infty) \times J$ . **Thus  $G$  has a point of discontinuity in  $1/B_T$ .**

## A JUMP IN THE STATE-PRICE DENSITY

Thus, in general, for a given payoff  $h$  with distribution function  $F$ , we have  $\text{im}(1 - F) \not\subseteq \text{im}(G)$ . One possible way is to expand  $\xi_T$  as in Corollary 2:

$$\tilde{\xi}_T := \xi_T + p 1_{(\frac{1}{B_T}, \infty)}(\xi_T) + p E 1_{\{\frac{1}{B_T}\}}(\xi_T)$$

where we define

$$E := \frac{1}{1 + \exp(W_T - W_{t_0})}.$$

Now if  $\tilde{G}$  denotes the distribution function of  $\tilde{\xi}$ , then the payoff given by

$$Y^* := F^{\leftarrow}(1 - \tilde{G}(\tilde{\xi}-))$$

is cost-efficient.

Thank you!